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New Zealand has been blessed with an ecological evolution completely 
distinct from that experienced anywhere else in the world. The 80 
million years of isolation from other land masses has gifted us an 
almost entirely endemic variety of ecosystems, wildlife and vegetation. 
Yet, in only 800 years humans and their accompanying introduced 
organisms have eliminated a valuable proportion of our endemic bird 
life, invertebrates and fauna. Today the loss of biodiversity continues. 
Though land owned and managed by the Department of Conservation 
has proved a comparative success in redressing the depletion of 
biodiversity in these areas, the same cannot be said of biodiversity on 
privately owned land. New Zealand's current legal framework has 
been ineffective in addressing the protection of biodiversity on private 
land. The ensuing article seeks to find out reasons as to why this is the 
case. An in depth analysis of many of the regulatory mechanisms 
capable of protecting biodiversity on private land is undertaken. 
Similarly, the concept of private property as understood in New 
Zealand is also examined. The results of those discussions lead the 
author to believe the nature of private property in New Zealand is not 
conducive to effective biodiversity protection on private land, even 
with regulatory restrictions. If biodiversity is ever to thrive on private 
land, the fundamental nature of private property rights must be 
changed. 
5 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page and footnotes) comprises 
of approximately 13, 500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand has been blessed with an ecological evolution completely 
distinct from that experienced anywhere else in the world. The 80 million 
years of isolation from other land masses has gifted us an almost entirely 
endemic variety of ecosystems, wildlife and vegetation.1 Yet, in only 800 
years humans and their accompanying introduced organisms have 
eliminated 32 per cent of indigenous land and freshwater birds, 18 per 
cent of sea birds, 3 frogs, 12 invertebrates, 3 reptiles and 11 plants.2 With 
these losses in mind, it is not surprising that the Minister for the 
Environment has stated that the depletion of biodiversity is the 
environmental issue for New Zealand.3 
In attempting to halt and reverse such a trend of biodiversity degradation, 
in the last 25 years various governmental entities have enacted legislation, 
regulation and other policy which have sought to address the various 
causes of biodiversity loss.4 These measures have tended to focus on 
threatened species and vegetation via the creation of protected areas, in 
particular on Crown owned and supervised land. Much of New Zealand's 
biodiversity and distinctive habitats are not included in these protected 
areas. Many of our ecologically rich habitats are found on privately owned 
land and which run the risk of being damaged, due to the possibility of 
intentional and unintentional harm.5 
1 Deparhnent of Conservation In Ecological Res toration of New Zealand Islands (Diamond 
Jared, Wellington, 1990) 3-8. 
2 I Smith (ed) The State of New Zealand's Environment (Ministry for the Environment, 
Wellington, 1998) 5 ["State of the Environment"]. 
3 Minister for the Environment: Right Honorary Simon Upton, Key note Address at Pest 
Summit 1999, Convention Centre, Palmerston North, 8 April 1999. 
4 Examples include the Forests Act 1949, Wildlife Act 1953, Native Plants Protection Act 
1934, National Parks Act 1980, Reserves Act 1977, and Marine Mammals Act Protection 
Act 1978. Other developments include the creation of the Department of Conservation 
and the Ministry for the Environment, under the Conservation Act 1987 and the 
Environment Act 1986, respectively. 
5 The author is aware of the reality that biodiversity, itself, does not recognise the human 
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Policy makers have only recently begun to understand that to protect our 
nation's biodiversity effectively, policy and measures which address 
biodiversity on private land are necessary.
6 Yet a lack of understanding 
and knowledge on the part of policy makers as to how to approach the 
protection of biodiversity has led to disparate and piecemeal legislation -
legislation which does not holistically address the true scope and issues of 
protecting biodiversity on privately owned land. Examples of such 
attempts which concern biodiversity protection and touch the domain of 
private property include the Resource Management Act 1991, the Forests 
Amendment Act 1993, the Wildlife Act 1953 and the Hazardous 
Substances and New Organisms Act 1996. This year, possibly in 
acknowledgment of the failing of this piecemeal legislation, the 
Department of Conservation and Ministry for the Environment has 
published a Proposed National Draft Strategy for Biodiversity.
7 One of six 
primary strategic goals listed in the Draft Strategy is focused solely on 
sustaining biodiversity on private land.
8 
Given this factual background, biodiversity protection on private land is a 
key area of environmental concern for New Zealand. This research paper 
specifically aims to address the following matters in relation to the legal 
framework for the protection of biodiversity on private land: 
parameters of private versus Crown owned land. There is significant force in the 
proposition that biodiversity need be addressed on its own terms. However this paper 
initially must approach biodiversity protection from within New Zealand's current 
conceptions of legal ownership and private property. 
6 Private land refers to land not owned or under the management of the Crown. The 
Crown is the proprietor of all land to which no subject can show title - see also 
Conservation Act 1987 s 2. Also excluded in the concept of private land is land owned by 
local authorities, or land managed by the Department of Conservation. The vast majority 
of New Zealand's land holdings are privately owned. 
7 Ministry for the Environment and Department of Conservation A Draft Strategy for New 
Zealand's Biodiversity (Wellington, 1999). 
8 A Draft Strategy for New Zealand's Biodiversity, above n 7, 103-4. 
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• To clarify what policy makers are exactly talking about when they try 
to protect biodiversity (Section II); 
• To identify and examine New Zealand's current legislative framework 
for conserving biodiversity on private land (Section Ill); 
• To assess to what extent this framework provides an adequate 
protection of biodiversity on private owned land (Section IV); 
• To discuss to what extent this framework limits the property rights of 
private landowners (Section V); 
• To discuss whether the current understanding of private property 
provides a justifiable basis for such limitations of property rights 
(Section VI); 
• To assess whether the nature of our current conceptions of property, 
even if restricted by regulatory means, are capable providing 
successful protection of biodiversity loss on private land (Section VII). 
This last issue serves as the primary concern of the research paper. In 
particular this paper argues that the current understanding of private 
property rights in New Zealand is inherently inconsistent with the 
protection of biodiversity on private land.9 Furthermore, it is the author's 
belief that this inconsistency is sufficiently extensive so as to be the major 
reason why existing regulatory attempts to protect biodiversity have 
proved practically ineffective in New Zealand. 
In summary, the thesis of this paper can be encapsulated in the following 
two sentences. The nature of private property in New Zealand is not 
conducive to effective biodiversity protection on private land, even with 
9 It may be possible to correlate the author's conclusions regarding private property in 
New Zealand to other common and civil law jurisdictions. This could be due to New 
Zealand's strong hereditary relationship with the Common law and the generally similar 
concepts of private property under civil legal systems. However the conclusions of this 
paper are only proposed by the author in relation to New Zealand legislation and 
property rights. 
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regulatory restrictions on those rights in the land. If biodiversity is ever to 
thrive on private land, the fundamental nature of private property rights 
must be changed to intrinsically incorporate ecological values. 
II WHAT IS BIODIVERSITY? 
This section attempts to provide those reading the paper with an 
understanding of the concept of biodiversity, so as to permit informed 
discussion of the legislative mechanisms which attempt to protect it later 
in the paper. Furthermore, this section intends to point out not only the 
fundamental threads of biodiversity but also the many problems in 
actually deriving any practical meaning from such an encompassing 
concept. 
A A Definition? 
Biodiversity has become a term that enjoys common currency m both 
scientific and legal literature on ecology, and yet it is concept which is 
very difficult to define simply or inclusively.
10 In the State of New Zealand's 
Environment Report, "biodiversity" is summarily described as the variety of 
life.11 But it is a multi-dimensional concept, and can mean different things 
to people in different settings.
12 Generally, biodiversity is accepted as 
'° Note "biodiversity" is derived from the formal term "biological diversity", which was 
first formally adopted in the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 1992, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil. 
'' State of the Environment, above n 2, 5. 
12 This point is often made by various ecological commentators - for a New Zealand 
example see: I Atkinson "Biodiversity: What is it, and Why is it Important?" in B 
McFadgen and P Simpson (eds) Biodiversity: Papers from a Seminar Series on Biodiversity 
(Wellington, Department of Conservation, 1996) ["Biodiversity: What is it"]. However, 
biodiversity at the least does provides biologists with a key indicator of the ecological 
health or stress a species or ecosystem is under. To this extent, genetic diversity 
contributes to the population dynamics of a species, thus providing biologists with an 
indicator of the variety and interdependence of a species or ecosystem. Significant 
diversity amongst living communities, or diversity which varies over time is seen as 
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including the diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems 
and the processes that maintain them. 13 These three measures of 
biodiversity have been identified to include: 14 
(a) Species diversity - the number of different species of plants and animals, 
including micro-organisms, in a given area; 
(b) Genetic diversity - the genetic differences between and within species and 
their constituent populations; 
(c) Ecological (or "communities") diversity - the number of different ecosystems, 
biotic communities or ecological processes in an area (including communities 
and their habitats). 
However, this predominantly scientific focused definition does not, on its 
face, provide participants of the legal system with a workable and easily 
understood definition of biodiversity. Moreover it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to finitely state the scientific meaning of the concept of 
biodiversity. When one examines the question how does one protect 
biodiversity on private land, a necessary prerequisite in achieving that 
protection is knowing in fact are we trying to protect. It is possible to 
interpret biodiversity as many things when applying such an embracing 
concept to the practicalities of protecting individual incidents of habitat or 
wildlife on private land. For example are policy makers trying to protect 
the variety of the ecosystems present in an area? Or is it the survival of the 
ecosystems themselves? Or is it merely a roundabout term to describe the 
protection of the environment generally? Similarly when determining 
what biodiversity to protect, do policy makers have to make value 
judgments as to which species or ecosystems we wish to secure? Or do 
policy makers assume all biodiversity is equally valuable regardless of its 
origins or setting? 
strong evidence of the stability and longevity of a species or ecosystem. 
13 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
1
' A Draft Strategy for New Zealand's Biodiversity, above n 7, 131. See also Convention on 
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Questions such as these are critically important for the protection of 
biodiversity on private land, particularly when one considers the 
necessary standard of certainty required for the effective application of 
legal rules. 15 The law must be sufficiently certain in its application, so that 
private landowners know and understand the nature of the obligations 
and rights conferred via their legal interest in an area of land. If legislators 
cannot define "biodiversity" to a sufficiently precise standard, then any 
attempts to holistically approach biodiversity in legislation may be unclear 
as to what, practically, is being addressed. If this is the case, the 
effectiveness of any attempts to protect biodiversity via a legal framework 
will be inhibited. 
B Introduced and Indigenous Biodiversity: Is There a Distinction? 
The ambiguity inherent in the concept of biodiversity is especially obvious 
when one considers the tension between the notions of indigenous 
wildlife and habitat and introduced wildlife and habitat. It is generally 
accepted by biologists that ecosystems are dynamic, in a perpetual state of 
change, whether it be growth, recession or a cyclic process.
16 Similarly all 
organisms and ecosystems migrate or disperse to some extent. The nature, 
distribution and diversity of species has fluctuated throughout the earth's 
history. Since the arrival of humans these movements have been 
amplified. Currently, the world is in a period of its history where human 
activities such as the mingling of many organisms from different parts of 
the world, the creation of genetically engineered organisms, hunting, 
habitat depletion and pollution are altering the nature of the ecological life 
Biological Diversity, June 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
15 It a truism that legal rules in a legal system must be sufficiently certain to be 
understood to be rules at all - see H L A Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1994) 124-33. 
16 ARE Sinclair Dynamics of an Ecosystem (University of Chicago Press, 1979) 20-35. 
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cycle prior to human influence. 17 The result is a cumulative modification 
of biodiversity as a global consequence of human activity. 18 These 
influences have contributed to world wide trend of an increase in 
introduced diversity, while indigenous diversity has decreased.19 Very few 
areas of unmodified natural habitat remain,2° and furthermore in many 
areas it may be difficult to distinguish between indigenous and introduced 
ecosystems, so great is the influence of human activity on biodiversity.21 
The modern world is not a primordial paradise, but is comprised of a 
multitude of humanly modified habitats, continually affected by the 
activities of human populations. 
Then should policy makers be primarily concerned with protecting 
indigenous biodiversity? The Minister for the Environment has stated this 
is the primary focus of A Draft Strategy for New Zealand's Biodiversity, but 
not at the expense of introduced biodiversity.22 Introduced biodiversity 
provides New Zealand with a significant portion of our export wealth and 
it would make utilitarian sense to attempt to protect introduced 
biodiversity similarly. The complex interaction between these two 
categories of diversity provide policy makers and legislators with 
17 There is an argument against protecting biodiversity inherent in the dynamic nature of 
ecosystems - namely how can you protect something which is forever in a state of 
constant change. It may be fruitless to try and attempt to keep biodiversity in its current 
(or previous) balance, for biodiversity is always in a process of change. Furthermore, it is 
not clear why one should try and remove the influence human activity has on 
biodiversity if it assumed that humans form a natural constituent part of the world's 
ecosystems. 
18 A J Challis "The Human Parameters of Biodiversity" in B McFadgen and P Simpson 
Biodiversity: Papers from a Seminar Series on Biodiversity (Wellington, Department of 
Conservation, 1996) 
19 R Halloy Native and Managed Diversity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996). 
20 Even areas such as Antarctica and unpopulated parts of Africa and the Russian republic 
bear the influence of human activity. Influences such as ozone depletion, atmospheric 
pollution and other residual human waste products can have just as significant effect on 
biodiversity as can more direct and obvious human influences such as habitat depletion. 
21 Halloy, above n 19, 13. 
22 Minister for the Environment: Right Honorary Simon Upton, Key note Address at Pest 
Summit 1999, Convention Centre, Palmerston North, 8 April 1999 above n 3. See also A 
Draft Strategy for New Zealand's Biodiversity above n 7, 22. 
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significant unresolved issues as to how to formulate measures which 
adequately cater for both categories of biodiversity. 
What then is an acceptable and legally workable meaning of biodiversity 
for the purposes of this research paper? Having considered the 
uncertainties of the many attempts to quantify the real elements of 
biodiversity, the author considers a general definition accepted in A Draft 
Strategy for New Zealand's Biodiversity as best suited for this paper.
23 The 
description encompasses all forms of biological life, but places priority on 
the protection and rehabilitation of indigenous biodiversity. Admittedly, 
this definition does not in itself resolve the practical problems of 
formulating rules of legal consequence which clarify what particular 
incidents of biodiversity need protection and it may be impossible to 
finitely state the limits of biodiversity. And though conflicts over 
assessments, priorities and programmes can develop between those 
approaching biodiversity from different perspectives, it is submitted the 
general thrust of the biodiversity concept is sufficiently distinct for it to be 
understood as a term of legal consequence. Biodiversity can only ever be a 
general precept, but this does not prevent it from being broken down into 
smaller principles and categories by law makers in order to provide for 
meaningful effect to by given to the overarching precept. 
C Key Characteristics Distinguishing Biodiversity from other 
Environmental Conservation Concerns 
The encompassing nature of the concept of "biodiversity" has led to the 
23 The author acknowledges that such a definition does not add much to the 
understanding of the practical application of biodiversity. However it is not the purpose 
of this research paper to address and identify a complete and comprehensive definition 
of biodiversity. Save to say, that an explanation of the concept merely aims to provide 
readers with an understanding of the uncertainties involved in the broad concept of 
biodiversity. 
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criticism that it is simply passing itself off as another description of the 
environment.24 However the author submits that the focus of biodiversity 
is at least theoretically distinct, in that it is predominantly referring to the 
natural world or living organisms within their ecological habitat - as 
opposed to the physical and man-made surrounds generally included in 
the definition of environment.25 In practice, though, it is arguable that the 
distinction is meaningless. Protection of the environment necessarily 
includes the protection of biological life, and protection of biodiversity 
must include the protection of habitat - including perhaps even the 
human created habitat. It is submitted by the author that even in practical 
terms there are several distinct characteristics of biodiversity which make 
it necessary for a holistic biodiversity legal framework. These are traits 
which make biodiversity distinct from more conventional resource 
management or environmental issues, and which must be taken into 
account in policy and legislative design. Young has espoused several of 
these characteristics, six of which the Ministry for the Environment has 
adopted in formulating their biodiversity strategy.26 
First, in many circumstances biodiversity loss is irreversible.27 Even under 
current technology, once lost, a species or an ecosystem is lost forever. 
Second, many species - especially the invertebrates, microbes and viruses 
- remain undiscovered. It is estimated that the are between five and thirty 
24 Some definitions of biodiversity are broad enough to include landforms and 
landscapes, thereby also referring to the man-made physical world - see M Rojas The 
Species Problem and Conservation: What are we Protecting? (1992) 6 Conservation Biology 
170,177. 
25 There is not one accepted definition of the word "environment" - however it connotes 
at the very least some elements of the human created physical world which biodiversity 
does not primarily address. For a New Zealand example of the definition of 
"environment" sees 2 of the Resource Management Act 1991. 
26 MD Young and N Cunningham "Toward Optimal Environmental Policy: The Case of 
Biodiversity Conservation" (1997) 24(2) Eco L Q 243, 251-2. See also A Draft Strategy for 
New Zealand's Biodiversity, above n 7. 
27 
E B Barbier Paradise Lost?: The Ecological Economics of Biodiversity (Earthscan, London, 
1994) 18. 
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million species on the Earth, and of which only about one and a half 
million have ever been described. 
28 As a consequence, biodiversity can be 
lost before we know it is even there, leaving its ecological role and its 
potential contribution unknown. Third, ecosystem diversity exhibits 
threshold effects. Contemporary scientific evidence suggests that there are 
limits to the ability of ecosystems to withstand the stress imposed by 
environmental degradation.
29 Hence, if stressed beyond these limits the 
ecosystem will cease to function. As a consequence, any policy that 
compromises the resilience of ecosystems may have uncontrollable effects, 
and even small policy changes can have dramatic but unforeseen results. 
Fourth, the threshold effect is exacerbated by the fact that information 
about species' responses to biodiversity loss is extremely limited. Often 
obvious causes of loss such as habitat loss or hunting have little to do with 
biodiversity loss. The causes of genetic, species and ecosystem losses are 
extremely diffuse and involve many different sectors and forms of 
economic activity. Biodiversity is pervasive to social and economic 
systems, and is affected by land and water use decisions, by pollution and 
by human activity generally. Fifth, some biodiversity problems cannot be 
solved merely by proscribing certain behaviour. Preserving the integrity of 
some instances of biodiversity may require positive ongoing management, 
emphasises a custodianship ethic.
30 Sixth, substantial tensions between 
public and private interests can arise because much of biodiversity has no 
28 W L Filho, C Dykes, Z Murphy Raising Awareness of Biodiversity: Commonwealth Examples 
(Commonwealth of Learning, Bradford, 1996) 17. 
29 I A E Atkinson "Ecological Measures for Conserving Terrestrial Biodiversity: a New 
Zealand perspective" in P L Forey, CJ Humphries and R I Vane-Wright (eds) Systematics 
and Conservation Evaluation (Claredon Press, Oxford, 1994) 65. 
30 This point is debatable however depending on your philosophical perspective 
regarding protection of the environment. Some authors argue that management of 
biodiversity results in human generated nature ie the nature of the future will be the 
nature we make. Hence it is more desirable to leave ecosystems to adjust and adapt via 
their own natural processes - see Halloy, above n 19, 45. Others, however, argue that 
biodiversity protection is not merely about identifying a single instance or problem and 
dealing with that specific problem at that time - it must be about an on-going monitoring 
and management of an identified collection of ecosystems. For example consider the need 
for pest management programmes for feral weeds, possums and stoats. 
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economic value.31 While the protection of an instance of biodiversity may 
be desirable to policy makers and the public, it may not be for the private 
landowner especially if the individual must bear the cost. 
Consequently such distinct issues in the nature of biodiversity must be 
adequately addressed if the current New Zealand legal framework which 
endeavours to protect biodiversity on private land is to be effective and 
successful. 
III ANALYSIS OF NEW ZEALAND'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This section of the research paper seeks to identify the key legislative 
mechanisms in New Zealand which address the issue of protecting 
biodiversity on private land. The following analysis will only concern 
biodiversity protection measures which relate to the legal framework. 
The starting point for the protection of biodiversity on private land is the 
imperial Statute of Marlborough (UK) 1227.32 Chapter 23 of that statute 
requires a farmer not to make waste, sale, nor exile of house, woods, men, 
nor of anything belonging to the tenements that they have to farm, 
without special licence had by writing of covenant from the Crown. It is 
clear that even from this early time, the Crown was concerned with 
restricting the use of private property for the public good of protecting 
forest on private land. In New Zealand today, the major mechanism for 
protecting biodiversity on private land is the Resource Management Act 
1991 (hereinafter the "RMA"), and hence this forms the majority of the 
following discussion - but several other statutes are also canvassed. 
31 T Swanson "Regulating Endangered Species" (1993) 16 Economic Policy 184, 189-199. 
32 Chapter 23 of the Statute of Marlborough is still in force in New Zealand domestic law 
still by virtue of s 3(1) of the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988. 
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The author intends to identify the relevant provisions which aim to 
address the conservation of biodiversity on private land, and then specify 
any obvious limitations in the relevant statute. Other policy measures, 
while crucial in combination with legal controls for effective biodiversity 
protection, will not be the subject of analysis in this paper.
33 Admittedly 
these legislative controls and rules only form a small part of the various 
policy measures that individuals and the state are involved in which aim 
to protect biodiversity on private land. Accordingly any discussion of the 
legal framework does not to purport to provide universal conclusions 
applicable to the other policy type measures available. It simply is an 
analysis of the appropriateness of the mechanisms within the current legal 
framework which attempt to protect biodiversity on private land. 
A Biodiversity Protection under the Resource Management Act 1991 
The RMA sets out a regulatory framework and some broad national goals, 
in relation to the environment. The RMA's purpose is "to promote the 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources".3-1 While 
biodiversity is not specifically expressly stated as one of the RMA's 
objectives, it is probable that the protection of biodiversity is, in fact, 
included in the concept of sustainable management. Sustainable 
management means managing the use, development and protection of 
natural and physical resources.
35 Hence a key component of sustainable 
management under section 5(2) is protection. Also the ambit of the 
concept of "natural resources" would appear on its natural meaning to 
include biodiversity, and hence the protection of biodiversity forms an 
33 Other types of mechanisms which can be combined to achieve an integrated 
biodiversity protection policy, and are not discussed in this paper include: information, 
education and motivation programmes; creating financial incentives to promote 
conservation of biodiversity; and voluntary agreements between landowners or land-
owners and the state. 
3-l RMA, s 5(1). 
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integral part of the concept of sustainable management under the RMA. 
The term "protection" is not defined m the RMA, but it is defined m 
section 2 of the Conservation Act 1987. 
"Protection" in relation to a resource, means its maintenance, so far as is 
practicable, in its current state; but includes -
(a) its restoration to some former state; and 
(b) its augmentation, enhancement or expansion. 
This definition includes the concept of restoration and enhancement as 
being part of protection. While the Conservation Act 1987 definition is not 
definitive, it is submitted that this interpretation is sufficient for a 
meaningful understanding of the "protection" purpose of the RMA. This 
is particularly so when one considers that both the relevant Acts address 
similar subject matter and the dearth of any judicial discussion conveying 
a differing meaning. The term "protection" is also used in section 6 of the 
RMA - but only in relation to significant areas of indigenous vegetation 
and habitats.36 
Section 6 requires those exercising functions in relation to the RMA to 
recognize and provide for certain matters of national importance. These 
include the protection of outstanding natural features and areas of 
significant indigenous vegetation and also the preservation of the natural 
character of the marine and fresh water environment.37 To date, judicial 
application of this section in relation to the protection of biodiversity has 
35 RMA, s 5(2). 
36 RMA, s 6(c). Note also the term "preservation" is also used in s 6 in relation to the 
coastal and freshwater environment. It too is not defined in the RMA, but is defined in s 2 
of the Conservation Act 1987 as follows: 
"Preservation" in relation to a resource means the maintenance, so far as is 
practicable, of its intrinsic values. 
37 RMA, s 6(a)-(c). 
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been limited. In Gill v Rotorua District Council,
38 Judge Kenderdine stated 
that " .. .implicit in section 6(a) is the protection of ecosystems and 
ecological processes and the extent to which these are modified by any 
development". This is so even though explicit protection is given to the 
intrinsic values of ecosystems under section 7(d) of the RMA. The scope of 
natural character in section 6(a) was discussed in Trio Holdings and Treble 
Tree v Marlborough District Council.
39 Natural character was considered to 
be a complex integration and interaction of several components relating to 
aspects of the vegetation, land form, and aesthetic aspects of adjoining 
land, as well as beaches, coastal marine waters and benthic environment. 
It is suggested the preservation and active protection of the natural 
character of waterbodies and their margins includes the protection of key 
elements of biodiversity, namely natural ecosystems and ecological 
processes. 4
0 
Section 7 of the RMA is also relevant in terms of biodiversity protection. 
That section requires those exercising functions under the RMA to have 
particular regard to the intrinsic values of ecosystems.
41 "Intrinsic values" 
in relation to ecosystems is defined in section 2 as meaning those "aspects 
of ecosystems and their constituent parts which have value in their own 
right, including their biological and genetic diversity and the essential 
characteristics that determine an ecosystem's integrity, form, functioning 
and resilience." This is the only part of the RMA which makes explicit 
mention of biodiversity, though several other parts of the RMA make 
provision for specific aspects of biodiversity to protected or preserved.
42 
Apart from the Part II provisions of the RMA, other specific mechanisms 
38 Gill v Rotorua District Council (1993) 2 NZRMA 604 (PT). 
39 Trio Holdings and Treble Tree v Marlborough District Council (24 May 1996) unreported, 
Planning Tribunal, Wellington, W103/96, Judge Kendergine. 
40 New Zealand's Coastal Policy Statement follows this assumption - see chapter 1 and 
appendix 3. 
41 RMA, s 7. 
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are present to protect natural features, including water conservation 
orders, heritage orders, designations, esplanade reserves and strips.43 But 
many of these mechanisms predominantly address other issues and 
values, and are not solely or even primarily focused on biodiversity 
protection. For example, section 6( c) of the RMA aims to protect areas of 
significant indigenous vegetation. This protection may be motivated by 
cultural reasons as much as any intrinsic biodiversity concerns.44 
B Biodiversity Protection via Other Legislation 
Apart from the Resource Management Act 1991, many of the current 
rights and duties relating to biodiversity on privately owned land are also 
contained in legislation such as Wildlife Act 1953, Forests Act 1949, Native 
Plants Protection Act 1934, Conservation Act 1987, The Reserves Act 1977, 
National Parks Act 1980 and the Hazardous Substances and New 
Organisms Act 1996. The relevance of these statutes will be addressed in 
the following section. 
1 Forests Act 1949 
Provisions in this Act attempt to address the protection of indigenous 
forest, clearly a constituent part of biodiversity. The Forests Amendment 
Act 1993 established new controls on the export of indigenous timber. It 
inserted a new Part IHA into the Forests Acts 1949, the purpose of which 
was to promote sustainable management of indigenous forest land.45 
42 RMA, s 6, s 13. 
43 RMA, ss 199-217 water conservation orders, ss 187-98 heritage orders, ss 229-237H 
esplanade reserves and ss 168-198 designations. 
44 
The author wonders whys 6(c) only refers to significant areas of indigenous vegetation 
and not to all indigenous vegetation. It is possible that such a specific focus is due to the 
financial benefits derived from some indigenous vegetation, which would be reduced if 
all indigenous vegetation was referred to. 
45 Forests Act 1949, s 67B. 
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Sustainable forest management is defined as meaning "the management of 
an area of indigenous forest land in a way that maintains the ability of the 
forest growing on that land to continue to provide a full range of products 
and amenities in perpetuity while retaining the forest's natural values.
1146 
The Forests Amendment Act 1993 established prohibitions on the export 
of indigenous timber and on the milling of indigenous timber except in 
certain circumstances. These circumstances include operations that occur 
in accordance with a registered sustainable forest management plan.
47 The 
requirements for these plans are set out in the Second Schedule of the 
Forests Act 1949, and take effect for a period not less than 50 years. 
Similarly the Forests Amendment Act 1993 does not apply to indigenous 
forests being cleared, but not being milled.
48 The Act does not address 
logging for purposes other than sawn timber production, and does not 
apply to land clearance and fire wood cutting. Forgetting whether these 
provisions are practically effective in giving protection to biodiversity , the 
concept of sustainable forest management can only provide protection in 
anthropocentric terms. The Act does not address the entire forest 
ecosystem, but merely the trees capable of providing a full range of 
products and amenities. 
2 Wildlife Act 1953 
The Wildlife Act 1953 vests all wildlife in the Crown, and hence the Act is 
applicable to all wildlife residing on all land, including privately owned 
land.49 The Act operates on the initial premise that all wildlife in New 
-16 Forests Act 1949, s 2(1). 
47 Forests Act 1949, s 67C and s 67D. However the Crown's West Coast indigenous 
production which are managed by Timberland West Coast Limited and Southland are 
exempted from the requirements of the Act. 
48 Forests Act 1949, s 67 A. Note also that the Act applies in conjunction with the 
provisions and controls available under the RMA. The interaction between these two acts 
continues to confuse a number of territorial authorities. 
49 Wildlife Act 1953, s 57. But does not include wildlife listed in the Fifth Schedule, such as 
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Zealand is absolutely protected.so Only the categories of wildlife listed in 
the several schedules of the Act are not absolutely protected. Individual 
species are categorised into those which are partially protected, those 
which receive no protection and those which are noxious.s1 All the 
remaining species not mentioned are absolutely protected. It is an offence 
to take protected wildlife. This includes the hunting, killing, robbing, 
disturbing or destroying of protected wildlife.s2 The Act is enforced by 
Department of Conservation rangers, who have the power to enter private 
land at any time to further the purposes of the Act.s3 The Act also provides 
for the creation of wildlife refuges and wildlife management reserves, 
which requires the consent of the occupier on private land.54 Though the 
creation of wildlife sanctuaries via a Crown proclamation is permitted 
without the consent of the occupier, the landowner is entitled to due 
compensation.ss All of these reserves are to be managed by the 
Department of Conservation.56 There is, however, no regulation in the Act 
of activities which might remove habitat. The Act is solely directed at the 
prohibition of individual intentional acts to harm wildlife.s7 
3 Native Plants Protection Act 1934 
The Native Plants Protection Act 1934 came into operation accompanied 
by a warrant issued from the Governor-General declaring that all plants 
domesticated and farm animals. 
50 Wildlife Act 1953, s 4. "Wildlife" is defined in s 2 of the Act as including any animal 
that is living in a wild state. "Animal" is also defined to include any mammal (not being a 
domestic animal or a rabbit or a hare or a seal or other marine mammal), any bird (not 
being a domestic bird), any reptile, or any amphibian and includes any terrestrial or 
freshwater invertebrate declared to be an animal under section 7B of this Act and any 
marine species declared to be an animal under section 7BA of this Act. 
51 Wildlife Act 1953, ss 3-7 and the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Schedules. 
52 Wildlife Act 1953, s 63. 
53 Wildlife Act 1953, s 59 and s 60. 
54 Wildlife Act 1953, s 14 and 14A. 
55 Wildlife Act 1953, s 9. 
56 Wildlife Act 1953, s l4B. 
57 Wildlife Act 1953, s 62 and s 63. 
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indigenous to New Zealand, with the exception of those specified, are 
protected under the Act.
58 All specified plants were therefore 
consequentially excluded from protection.
59 The Act provides that an 
offence is committed by every person who takes any protected native 
plant that is growing on Crown land or from private land without the 
consent of the owner or occupier.
60 Hence the Act provides no restraint on 
private landowners using or taking native plants on their own land. In this 
respect, the Act is effectively a worthless mechanism for the protection of 
biodiversity on private land. A landowner can do what ever she wishes to 
indigenous plant on her land. Furthermore, if an offender is caught under 
the Act the maximum penalty which can be imposed under the Act is $40 
- less than your average New Zealand parking ticket. 
4 The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 
The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (hereinafter the 
HSNO) affects all individuals businesses, and organisations that deals 
with hazardous substances and new organisms. Under the HSNO, no 
person may import or manufacture any hazardous substance, or import, 
develop, field test or release any new organism - unless that person is 
granted an approval under Part V of the Act.
61 The mere storing of 
hazardous substances must also comply with any restrictions an controls 
on that substance under the Act. In section 2, "hazardous substance" is 
defined as a substance that possesses the intrinsic properties of 
58 Native Plants Protection Act 1934, s 3(1). 
59 Native Plants Protection Act 1934 lists 10 separate plants and all species of algae (sea 
weeds and fresh water weeds), fungi, lichens, liverworts and mosses, all of which do not 
receive protection. 
60 Native Plants Protection Act 1934, s 4. "To take" is defined ins 2 as including gathering, 
plucking, cutting, pulling up, destroying, digging up, removing, or injuring the native 
plant. 
61 HSNO, s 25. The HSNO has set up an Environmental Risk Management Authority 
which implements and administers the Act. Its primary function is to determine 
applications under Part V of the Act to import or manufacture any hazardous substance, 
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explosiveness, flammability, a capacity to oxidise, corrosiveness, toxicity, 
or ecotoxicity. Potentially almost any substances could be caught in this 
definition.62 "New organism" is defined as a species of any organism that 
was not present in New Zealand at the date of the commencement of the 
HSNO, and includes genetically modified organisms. 
In relation to biodiversity protection, the purpose of the HSNO includes 
the safeguarding of the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems.6.3 In achieving this purpose, those exercising functions under 
the Act must take into account to the sustainability of all native and 
valued introduced flora and fauna and the intrinsic value of ecosystems.64 
All decisions under the Act must be consistent with these principles. 
Hence the HSNO aims to protect biodiversity on private land through the 
regulation of the types of substances and organisms which landowners 
may use, release or store on their property. 
5 Conservation Act 1987 
The Conservation Act 1987 is primarily concerned with the protection of 
natural resources on land owned by the Crown.65 It is generally accepted 
that biodiversity is a natural resource.66 In relation to the protection of 
biodiversity on private land, section 6(a) provides that where a private 
landowner consents, the Department of Conservation may manage that 
land for the purposes of conservation. The Act also contains provisions 
or import, develop, field test or release any new organism. 
62 In practice, regulations have set thresholds for each of these intrinsic properties beneath 
which a substance is not deemed to be "hazardous" for the purposes of the Act. 
63 HSNO, s5. 
64 HSNO, s 6(a) and (b). 
65 Conservation Act 1987, s 6(a), (ab) and (b). 
66 Certainly this is the very basis under which the Department of Conservation operates 
on. See also V Froude Implementing the Biodiversity Protection Provisions in the Resource 
Management Act: A Review of Council Progress to Date (Pacific Rim Ecological Resource 
Management Association, Wellington, 1997) 4. 
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which provide for the use of covenants or land management agreements 
between the Department of Conservation and the landowner to further the 
conservation of the natural resources on that land.
67 There are no 
mandatory provisions in relation to biodiversity protection for private 
land holders under this Act, but there is the option for the protection of 
biodiversity through the implementation of the mechanisms and 
management procedures of the Department of Conservation to be 
implemented. 
Also relevant under the Conservation Act 1987 is the protection of 
freshwater species of fish. Under section 6(ab) it is a function of the 
Department of Conservation to preserve so far as is practicable all 
indigenous freshwater fisheries, and protect recreational freshwater 
fisheries and freshwater fish habitats.
68 Freshwater fisheries are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Act due to the fact that the beds of all navigable 
waterways and lakes are held to be vested in the Crown.
69 It makes no 
difference to the ownership of these waterways whether they pass 
through privately owned land or Crown land. Hence the aquatic fisheries 
present in water ways are subject to the management of the Department of 
Conservation. 
6 The Reserves Act 1977 and National Parks Act 1980 
These Acts are only relevant to the protection of biodiversity on private 
land to the extent that the Crown can compulsorily acquire land it 
considers worthy of preservation and Department of Conservation 
67 Conservation Act 1987, s 27 and s 29. 
68 Conservation Act 1987, ss 17J-17M provide for fresh water fisheries management. See 
also s 48A which allows for the provision of special regulations for freshwater fisheries 
by the Department of Conservation, such as maximum quotas. 
69 Originally derived from s 261 of the Coal Mines Act 1979 and s 21 of the Water Soils 
and Conservation Act 1967 - both now repealed. These rights, however, continue under s 
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management.70 Both Acts are only mentioned to show that for more 
effective protection of biodiversity on private land, one solution is to 
convert that land to Crown owned and Department of Conservation 
managed land. Under both Acts the landowner receives due 
compensation via the Public Works Act 1981.71 Similarly, both Acts state 
the purpose for the creation of protected areas is to providing for the 
preservation and management of areas possessing wildlife, indigenous 
flora or fauna, environmental and landscape amenity or interest.72 
Furthermore the creation of these protected areas aims to ensure, as far as 
possible, the survival of all indigenous species of flora and fauna, in their 
natural communities and habitats.73 
C The Framework in Context 
The preceding mentioned statutes make up New Zealand's legislative 
framework for addressing biodiversity protection on private land. If one 
considers this framework as a crazy patchwork, these statutes make up the 
patches in the crazy patchwork of biodiversity protection. In this 
patchwork, the RMA is the biggest patch as the mechanism with the most 
potential to address biodiversity conservation. The other biodiversity 
statutes mentioned variously address different specific aspects of 
biodiversity, thereby forming other individual patches of the patchwork. 
Of course the patchwork could not hold together without the other 
essential non-legal policy measures which address biodiversity 
conservation such as voluntary agreements and education.74 These non-
legal mechanisms provide the seams of the patchwork, tying together the 
354 of the RMA. 
70 Reserves Act 1977, s 12; National Parks Act 1980, s 9. 
71 Reserves Act 1977, s 12; National Parks Act 1980, s 9 
72 Reserves Act 1977, s 3(1)(a); National Parks Act 1980, s 4. 
73 Reserves Act 1977, s 3(1)(b); National Parks Act 1980, s 5. 
74 See those discussed above n 33. 
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vanous legislative mechanisms. However the question must be asked 
whether this crazy patchwork as it stands is successfully conserving 
biodiversity on private land. In other words, are these legislative 
mechanisms in the biodiversity framework proving effective? 
IV ASSESSING 
FRAMEWORK 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEGAL 
In exammmg New Zealand's legislative framework for protecting 
biodiversity on privately owned land, in practical terms, it must be 
conceded that the current framework is not working.
75 While the loss of 
biodiversity in New Zealand is declining at a slower rate, policy makers 
are not yet able to actually maintain the current levels of biodiversity 
indicators, let alone enable the growth of biodiversity.
76 There is a lack of 
scientific empirical evidence quantifying the degree of biodiversity loss on 
private land. However, there are various statistical models and many 
anecdotal accounts which detail significant loss of wildlife and vegetation, 
particularly indigenous, on private land.
77 When this continuing loss on 
private land is considered against the achievements made on Crown 
owned land by institutions such as the Department of Conservation, it 
becomes obvious that the current legislative framework for biodiversity 
protection on private land has severe flaws.
78 This is a point readily 
75 A Draft Strategy for New Zealand's Biodiversity above n 7, 4. 
76 Froude, above n 66, 4. 
n See P M Blascke and K Green (eds) Biodiversity Now (Department of Conservation, 
Wellington, 1997). Such scientific indicators for biodiversity include species and genetic 
diversity within particular sample areas i.e. the number of species and the genetic 
diversity amongst a species. 
78 The Department of Conservation is responsible for the administration and management 
of New Zealand's reserves, national parks, endangered species havens and other various 
protected areas. The successes of these protected areas have been well documented. See 
D A Towns, C H Daughterty and I A E Atkinson (eds) Ecological Restoration of New 
Zealand Islands (Department of Conservation, Wellington, 1990); P Lawless and T 
Stephens "The Task of Conserving Biodiversity in New Zealand" in B McFadgen and P 
Simpson (eds) Biodiversity: Papers from a Seminar Series on Biodiversity (Wellington, 
Department of Conservation, 1996). 
28 
conceded by both the Department of Conservation and the Ministry for 
the Environment, and hence the protection of biodiversity on private land 
has been identified as the first requirement in the proposed agenda for 
action in New Zealand's Proposed Draft Strategy. The following 
discussion intends to identify and discuss the major reasons why the 
current legislative mechanisms are not able to provide effective protection 
of biodiversity on private land. 
A Problems with Biodiversity Protection under the RMA 
Firstly, the use of the RMA biodiversity prov1s1ons, as the primary 
legislative mechanism to protect biodiversity on private land, by territorial 
authorities has been extremely variable. Recent research into the 
implementation of the biodiversity provisions in the RMA suggests 
territorial authorities have been slow to realise the focus and potential of 
the RMA in relation to biodiversity protection.79 While most Regional 
Policy Statements did contain some criteria for identifying significant 
indigenous vegetation and wildlife habitats, there was considerable 
variation and also varying omissions and inconsistencies. Only some 
territorial authorities had prepared and notified regional coastal and 
freshwater plans. Many territorial authority officers reported that they did 
not have the training or expertise to adequately address the biodiversity 
protection provisions in the RMA.8° Furthermore, many territorial 
authorities reported that biodiversity protection was seen as a minor 
optional function. This 1s exemplified by the lack of biodiversity 
monitoring in all forms by territorial authorities and other protection 
bodies, and the fact that most territorial authorities have not finalised the 
various plans required under the RMA. It is submitted that this lack of 
implementation of the biodiversity protection mechanisms in the RMA by 
79 Froude, above n 66, 7. 
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territorial authorities is a key reason why the protection of biodiversity is 
not as effective as it could be. 
Secondly, it is possible that the RMA's lack of potency is due to a more 
fundamental reason than pure deficient implementation. It is submitted 
that the continued loss of biodiversity is also due to the lack of focus on 
the needs of biodiversity in the legislation itself. Apart from the section 
7(d) reference to the intrinsic value of ecosystems, the RMA makes no 
direct mention of the need to protect biodiversity, or more particularly 
biodiversity on private land. This lack of explicit focus may well have led 
to the low priority being given to the protection of biodiversity by 
territorial authorities and private landowners. Territorial authorities have 
an almost unfettered discretion in relation to biodiversity to decide what 
the contents of their regional and district plans may address.
81 Therefore if 
a territorial authority, for political reasons, does not wish to impose 
potentially unpopular or expensive biodiversity land use restrictions, then 
it is within its rights not to do so. 
Thirdly, even where there are structured and considered biodiversity 
protection provisions in territorial authority plans, the use of regulation to 
impose land-use restrictions faces often insurmountable enforcement 
problems. The areas to be policed are large and often remote, and the 
problems of proof are daunting.
82 Many landowners will only cooperate 
with regulation if it is accompanied by realistic threats of vigorous 
enforcement. We cannot expect landowners of private property to comply 
purely out of commitment to the values that the law embodies. 
Fourthly, simple restrictions on land use under the RMA will not suffice. 
so Froude, above n 66, 4. 
81 Within the parameters allowed under the RMA purpose provisions, s 32 and the 
hierarchy of national and regional policy statements and plans. 
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As illustrated above, even where land use regulations are only concerned 
with the imposition of restrictions, there are significant problems standing 
in the way of converting legal commands into effective controls. These 
problems are amplified where the aim is to make land holders take 
positive action. Many commentators believe a crucial requirement in an 
effective strategy for biodiversity conservation is the active management 
and restoration of ecosystems.83 It is one thing to prohibit some one from 
performing an act, but it is another thing to compel someone to perform 
an act. If the community expects landowners to actively manage their land 
in order to protect biodiversity in a context where the market offers few 
incentives, common sense suggests it is going to have to pay for it. Once 
this is recognised, it becomes clear that biodiversity conservation on 
private land cannot be achieved by legislation and regulation alone. 
B Problems with Biodiversity Protection under Other Legislation 
The rest of the legislative framework is problematic as well.84 Each piece of 
legislation addresses only one particular element or incident of 
biodiversity on privately owned land. The Native Plants Protection Act 
1934 addresses only particular native plants species. The Forests Act 1949 
only deals with the logging of indigenous forests, but not the clearing of 
indigenous forests. The Wildlife Act 1953 has a broader application, but 
still only refers to species of wildlife - and not the habitats or ecosystems 
with in which the species exist. 
82 Froude, above n 66, 16. 
83 See further discussion of this point in Section II and also above n 30. 
84 The Conservation Act 1987, the Reserves Act 1977 and the National Parks Act 1980 will 
not be discussed in this section, due the nature of those Acts being directed at the 
conversion of privately owned and run land to Crown owned and run land. They do not 
actually address the methods by which the protection of biodiversity diversity can be 
achieved, with out the acquisition of the land by the Crown itself. Similarly, there is no 
discussion regarding the HSNO. This is due to the fact this Act only came fully into effect 
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The strength of these specialised pieces of legislation is their specific focus, 
which provides those using the statutes with clear rules and guidelines 
allowing easy implementation of their provisions. These Acts clearly 
identify which species are to be protected and the consequences of non-
compliance with those rules. However the specific nature of these statutes 
is also their fundamental weakness. This formulation has led to a 
disjointed and piecemeal formula for the protection of biodiversity. 
Biodiversity is a broad and encompassing concept, yet these statutes only 
address particular facets of biodiversity. It is possible that the lack of 
legislation which addresses biodiversity holistically is due to the 
inherently difficult process of defining biodiversity holistically, as 
discussed in Section II. The legislation only been able to focus on specific 
facets of biodiversity and this has led to the haphazard fragmentary 
nature of the biodiversity legislative framework. 
These Acts primarily attempt to protect biodiversity via a "species by 
species" approach. This approach requires the identification and listing of 
all known threatened and endangered species in order to regulate their 
taking, destruction or harm.
85 This is the approach clearly adopted in the 
Native Plants Protection Act 1934, and the Wildlife Act 1953. The use of 
this approach alone has been shown by commentators as insufficient if 
policy makers wish to protect biodiversity holistically.
86 For example, 
although the North Island brown kiwi is protected by the Wildlife Act 
1953, its habitat on private land is not always protected. Many kiwi are 
on 30 April 1999, and there is little available information as to its success or otherwise. 
85 For a fuller explanation of the species approach see: J Bradsen "Biodiversity Legislation: 
Species, Vegetation and Habitat" (1992) 9 Env & Plan LJ 175. 
86 The focus on protecting individual species runs into trouble when the legislation, 
though it may protect the identified wildlife species from direct harm, it cannot protect 
the wildlife species from more indirect forms of harm such as habitat loss, ecosystem 
variance or pollution. The impact on species tends to be death by a thousand cuts as 
development nibbles away at habitat. For further discussion see: G D Meyers and S 
Temby "Biodiversity and the Law: A Review of the Commonwealth Endangered Species 
Protection Act 1992 (1994) 3 Grif L Rev 39; Bradsen, above n 85, 178. 
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killed each year by vegetation clearance on private land.87 Recent 
scholarship has recommended the integration of a "systems" type 
approach for effective biodiversity protection.88 A "systems" approach is 
concerned with the identification and protection of the habitats in which 
species exist in. This approach aims to protect the interconnected 
ecosystems within a specific area and not just a particular species. Such an 
approach has proved effective in other jurisdictions in its ability to protect 
biodiversity from habitat destruction, habitat figmentation and other more 
indirect forms of harm.89 
In relation to private land, only the RMA purports to take a "systems" 
type approach to prevent biodiversity loss. Yet, as we have seen, the 
RMA' s potential to assist biodiversity protection is being severely 
neglected by territorial authorities. It may be possible to view the Forests 
Act 1949 as an example of a "systems" approach, in that it seeks the 
protection of indigenous forests. Even if it possible to view the Forests Act 
1949 in this manner, the Act is not an effective example of the "systems" 
approach. That Act still allows milling of indigenous forests if it can 
shown that that milling is sustainable, and furthermore it does not prevent 
clearing of indigenous forest (only the milling of indigenous forest for 
sale). No other piece of New Zealand legislation has as yet adopted a 
systems approach to biodiversity conservation. It is submitted the 
effectiveness of the biodiversity legislative framework has been limited by 
the lack of integration of a "systems" approach. It may well be that the 
RMA is able to reduce this problem if its potential to protect biodiversity 
on private land is recognised and utilised by territorial authorities. But as 
illustrated earlier this is not the case at present. 
87 
Ministry for the Environment Property Rights Regimes and Indigenous Biodiversity at 
<http:/ /www.biodiv.govt.nz/papers.htm> (last accessed 24 September 1999). 
88 J Sax "The Ecosystem Approach: New Departures for Land and Water" (1997) 24 Eco L 
Q883. 
89 Bradsen, above n 85, 175-180. 
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C An Overall Problem with Biodiversity Protection 
Lastly, the author submits the ineffectiveness of the current legal setting is 
chiefly due to the inconsistency which arises in trying to merge two 
conflicting political goals. In attempting to achieve the public good of 
biodiversity protection, there is a tension between the private property 
rights of those with interests in the land and the mechanisms and 
methodology required to achieve this protection. Under the current 
framework, the protection of biodiversity on private land involves the 
restriction of the private property rights of a landowner. A landowner is 
not free to do as she chooses with her land. The RMA is based on an initial 
premise that landowners can do anything they wish with their land, so 
long as this activity does not have adverse effects on the environment.
90 
But in reality this premise does not hold, given the excessive regulation by 
territorial authorities under regional and district plans.
91 
Property rights generally have a value in the market place, and any 
restriction on these rights accordingly leads to a reduction of the value of 
those rights. Therefore forays by regulation into the scope of a 
landowner's rights in that land can obviously cause bitterness and 
acrimony from that landowner. Such attitudes are, of course, not 
conducive to the protection of biodiversity on land. The effectiveness of 
the regulation will be greatly diminished if those in the most influential 
position to assist biodiversity protection do not agree with mechanisms 
utilised. The enormous scope of private land in New Zealand makes 
effective monitoring and enforcement of biodiversity protection 
impracticable, both financially and in terms of remoteness. This 
90 RMA, s9. 
91 0 McShane Land Use Control under the RMA: A Think Piece (Ministry for the 
Environment, Wellington, 1998). 
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enforcement issue means that any biodiversity legislation which is 
unpopular amongst private landowners faces an uphill battle if it is to be 
effective. 
The effect the inherent conflict between biodiversity regulation and 
individual property rights plays in the success of the biodiversity 
regulation is evident from the difference in the nature of biodiversity 
protection between Crown owned or managed land and privately owned 
and managed land. On private land, it is far more difficult for the Crown 
to gain access to information about levels of biodiversity than its is on 
their own land. Where a private landowner wishes to utilise her land in a 
particular fashion, ignorance may lead to the unknowing destruction of 
biodiversity. On Crown land, the availability and use of monitoring and 
information mechanisms makes this possibility far more unlikely. Even 
where the private landowner has knowledge of the biodiversity on her 
property, it is possible she may continue to utilise that land in a manner 
which harms the local plant and animal life. The probable lack of Crown 
information and enforcement resources will often mean that Crown 
organisations will have no knowledge of the harm incurred. Again 
compare this to the situation on Crown land, where identified biodiversity 
is protected from land uses which may harm it and where policy and 
programmes are often employed to promote biodiversity growth. 
Another evidentiary example of the role the conflict between biodiversity 
regulation and private property rights plays in biodiversity conservation 
can be inferred from the fact that the loss of biodiversity is a global 
phenomenon. It is not solely a New Zealand problem.92 The loss of 
biodiversity in New Zealand cannot be solely blamed on the 
ineffectiveness of our legislation and its implementation, unless the rest of 
92 Meyers and Temby, above n 86, 49. 
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the civilised world's legislation is also ineffective and poorly 
implemented. Admittedly there may be a variety of reasons why this 
situation exists. It may even be possible that other jurisdictions have made 
a political choice not to aim to protect biodiversity or that they are 
insufficiently resourced to address the problem. However, even in other 
developed Western nations, with systems of recognition of individual 
property rights, which have made several attempts to address biodiversity 
depletion through the legislative restriction of land use and property 
rights, the same losses have continued.
93 The universal existence of this 
situation makes it clear that there must be some other reason for the 
continued loss of biodiversity on private land rather than just than poor 
implementation or enforcement of policy. It is suggested that the 
perceived unfairness of imposing obligations by the state, which are 
implemented for the public good, onto a private individual is at least 
partly responsible for the universal situation of continued biodiversity 
loss. 
V HOW DOES THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AFFECT THE PRIVATE 
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF LANDOWNERS? 
This section seeks to examine how biodiversity legislation in New Zealand 
affects the private property rights of landowners and then asks why these 
legislative incursions into property rights may not have been embraced 
and supported by landowners. 
A Restriction of Property Rights under the RMA 
93 This is evident from many national reports on the status of an individual country's state 
of biodiversity. Those examined include: 0 T Sandlund Biodiversity in Norway (Ministry 
for the Environment, Trondheim, 1992); Department of the Environment Biodiversity in 
the United Kingdom (London, 1994); Federal Territorial Biodiversity Working Group 
Biodiversity in Canada (Hull, 1994); Federal Department of the Environment, Sport and 
Territories Biodiversity in Australia (Canberra, 1994). 
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Having earlier discussed how the RMA addresses biodiversity protection 
on private land in general, this section intends to address to what extent 
the Act affects the private property rights of landowners in addressing 
biodiversity conservation - both in terms of impairment and protection. 
1 Mechanisms in the RMA for interference with private property rights 
The RMA applies to all activities on land, including privately owned land. 
In particular, section 9 provides that land uses which contravene rules in a 
district or regional plan are prohibited unless specifically allowed by the 
granting of a resource consent or existing use rights.94 Hence these 
provisions lay down certain environmental and biodiversity protection 
mechanisms, which constrain existing and any future property rights. 
Note however that under sections 10 and lOA certain existing uses are 
allowed to continue, even though they may be inconsistent with a district 
plan.95 This means that existing uses which at present may harm 
biodiversity on private land cannot be interfered with by territorial 
authorities under the RMA, unless the effect of that existing use becomes 
different. 96 In summary, existing rights m property remam 
uncircumscribed under the RMA in terms of biodiversity protection on 
private land, but for future or intended uses of property the RMA limits 
the scope of the property rights available in relation to those uses of the 
land. 
90 RMA, s 9(1)-(3) 
95 RMA, s 20, s 10(1) and s lOA(l) . Note however that existing uses of land which affect 
the key regional council concerns listed under s 30(1)(c) are not free to continue - see s 
10(4). 
96 RMA, s 20(1)(c) which allows an existing land use to continue, in contravention of a 
plan rule without the need for a resource consent, provided "the effects of the activity are 
the same or similar in character, intensity, and scale to those which existed before the 
proposed plan was notified". 
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To what extent, then, does the RMA allow regional and district plans to 
limit private property rights in relation to biodiversity? It appears that the 
content of district and regional plans may limit the rights inherent in 
property to the extent that the restrictions further the purpose of the Act -
so long as expressly justified by reasoning and evaluation.
97 It is therefore 
entirely legitimate for territorial authorities to create rule in plans which 
may completely circumscribe a landowners private property right to use 
her land in any manner she thinks fit. Only during the submission process 
for a notified district plan may a landowner voice her objections to any 
proposed plan provisions which may adversely affect her property rights. 
Assuming a territorial authority ignores these objections, the landowner 
may pursue the matter and challenge the provision in the Environment 
Court.98 Close scrutiny as to whether the plan provisions are necessary to 
promote the purposes of the RMA, in particular regard to Part II and 
section 32 of the Act, will be undertaken by the Court.
99 If the territorial 
authority can show that the provision protects biodiversity, then it is likely 
that will be sufficient for the provision to stand due to section 7(d). In 
summary, any restriction of property rights will be seen as legitimate if 
they further the purposes of the RMA. 
Furthermore, section 85(1) of the RMA provides: 
An interest in land shall be deemed not to be taken or injuriously 
affected by reason of any provision in a plan unless otherwise provided 
for in this Act. 
The section creates a statutory fiction in that interests in land which are 
circumscribed by the mechanisms of the Act are deemed in law not to be 
circumscribed. The section means that in the absence of any deeming 
97 As required under s 31, and more particularly s 32 of the RMA. 
98 RMA, First Schedule. 
99 RMA, s 32(1)(a). Also Nicholls v District Council of Papakura [1998] NZRMA 233 (HC) 
[Nicholls]. 
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prov1s1on, an interest in land may be taken by a rule in a plan. The 
immediate practical consequence of section 85(1) is that the otherwise 
generally applicable compensation provisions of the Public Works Act 
1981 do not apply. Thus property owners have no right to money in lieu of 
their interests in property if those interests are in effect taken away or 
otherwise adversely affected under the RMA. 
2 Protection for the interference with property rights in the RMA? 
Only subsections (2) and (3) of section 85 in the RMA offer some 
protection for the institution of private property to landowners. Section 
85(2) provides that any person, having an interest in land to which a plan 
provision or proposed provision applies, considers that a provision would 
render that interest in land incapable of reasonable use, he or she may 
challenge that provision in the Environment Court.100 Note however that 
no compensation can be issued to an affected landowner.101 Section 85 only 
empowers the Environment Court to order or recommend that the 
provision be modified, deleted or replaced. 102 The Court must only exercise 
this power if it is satisfied that the provision places an unfair and 
unreasonable burden on the applicant. 103 Section 85 is designed to limit the 
100 The meaning of "incapable of reasonable use" is defined in s 85 as excluding any 
activity that would have a significant adverse effect on the environment or any person 
including the Crown. However the section itself remains silent as to how the assessment 
of reasonable use of land is to be made, thereby providing for the application of judicial 
discretion in this regard. This has resulted in some uncertainty for landowners and 
territorial authorities in determining when rights in land will be rendered incapable of 
reasonable use. 
101 The current legislative position on compensation differs to that used under the 
previous Town and Country Planning Act 1977 - see s 44 an s 126. Under that Act 
compensation was payable for certain restrictions to land use including land subdivision 
controls, bulk and location provisions. Where a landowner was deprived of the right to 
change from the existing use, compensation could be payable as long as the new use was 
"suitable" for the relevant land or building. 
1()2 RMA, s 85(3). 
103 RMA, s 85(3). This is a question of fact and degree and must be considered in the 
context of the Act - see Steven v Christchurch City Council (16 December 1997) unreported, 
Environment Court, Christchurch C38/98, Judge Jackson, 16-17 [Steven]. 
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controls on land which prevent reasonable use of that land, however it 
been held as only applying to district and regional plan rules, and not to 
designations, heritage orders or local authorities refusal to grant consent.
104 
Situations have arisen in New Zealand, though rare to date, where in 
order to further the purpose of the RMA on a private land holding, district 
plans have in fact restricted the use of that land so significantly that the 
landowner has challenged the relevant plan provision, due to her 
perception that the land has been rendered incapable of reasonable use.
105 
Similarly, it is not difficult to envisage a scenario where in order to protect 
an incident of valued biodiversity on private land, the same 
considerations will arise. For example if an extremely rare and valuable 
ecosystem of native vegetation and habitat existed on the entirety of an 
individuals land, and that specific type of habitat was not found anywhere 
else in that part of New Zealand. If that landowner wished to develop that 
land, but a district plan or proposed district plan provision exists which 
identifies that particular habitat for special protection thereby prohibiting 
any development of that land, the owner's rights in that land may have 
been rendered incapable of reasonable use. Such affected landowners may 
feel quite justified in wondering why they must bear the burden of the 
Crown's and public's need to protect biodiversity - a situation which has 
been rectified only in rare circumstances.
106 
B Other Biodiversity Legislation's Effect on Property Rights 
l(J.l Frieswick v Auckland City Council (26 April 1995) unreported, Planning Tribunal, 
Auckland A 40/95, Judge Sheppard [Frieswick]. 
105 See Frieswick above n 104, 6; Nicholls above n 99, 239; Mullins et Ors v Auckland City 
Council (17 April 1996) unreported, Planning Tribunal, Auckland A35/96, Judge 
Sheppard. 
106 To the author's knowledge, since the RMA came into force in October 1991, there has 
only been a single instance where the Environment Court has required a territorial 
authority to modify and delete a provision in a district plan which rendered the land 
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Generally, most of the other legislation relating to the protection of 
biodiversity on private land provides only minor limitations on the 
property rights of landowners. Possibly the most economically significant 
constraint originates from the Forests Act 1949 which means that 
landowners with tracts of indigenous forest on their land are not allowed 
to mill that forest. This limitation of such rights has meant some 
landowners cannot access the considerable value inherent in their land. 
The Crown is not liable to pay any compensation for any loss such a 
restriction has or may cause landowners. 107 
The HSNO is also a potentially invasive on the rights of landowners, for it 
can restrict many possible uses of the land due to its controls on the 
storage and manufacture of any hazardous substance and its prohibition 
on the release of new organisms. The broad nature of the definitions of 
"hazardous substance" and "new organism" only enhances the Act's 
potency. These provisions are capable of preventing a landowner growing 
a new species of crops or of making a landowner modify the way she 
manufactures a product. In all of these cases the individual land owner 
must bear the burden of meeting the requirements of the Environmental 
Risk Management Authority.108 
The Wildlife Act 1953 vests all wildlife in the Crown. This Act reformed 
the common law rule of all wildlife residing on the owner's land as 
property of the owner. 109 This restriction on the property rights of the 
landowner was not accompanied with any compensation. The Native 
Plants Protection Act 1934 does not prevent in any way a landowner from 
incapable of reasonable use - see Steven above n 103. 
107 Forests Amendment Act 1993, s 8. However the Crown can offer compensation if it 
wishes under that section. See also Bell Block Lumber Ltd v Attorney-General (18 March 
1998) unreported, High Court, Invercargill Registry, CP21/94 & CP22/94. 
108 HSNO, Part V. See also above n 61. 
l()'J J Waldon A Right to Private Property (Oxford, Claredon Press, 1986) 390-98. 
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her right to use the land in any manner she sees fit. That Act only prevents 
others from taking certain native plants from another's land. The 
Conservation Act 1987, the Reserves Act 1977 and the National Parks Act 
1980, in fact only have a very limited relationship to private property. 
These Acts only allow restrictions where the landowner has consented to 
the Crown's management of that land, or where the Crown has in fact 
compulsorily acquired that land. Similarly, the Conservation Act 1987 
makes cannot affect private property rights in relation to freshwater fish 
for there is no property as such in wild freshwater fish, and their habitat is 
vested in the Crown.110 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that these items of legislation do 
not provide overarching incursions into the realm of private property. 
However, in some instances and to some landowners, these incursions can 
be individually very significant. For example, companies which own land 
bought with the intention for native forest logging or where a landowner 
wishes run a commercial business for the hunting of certain wildlife on 
her land are situations where landowners have had the potential value of 
their property to them notably reduced. Again in such instances these 
landowners will not be supportive on the restraints on their freedom, and 
this is a scenario which will hinder the preservation of biodiversity. 
C Resulting Issues from Private Property Right Restraints 
On the whole, most of the activities which property rights enable 
landowners to execute appear to be affected primarily by the RMA plan 
110 At least until they are caught or dead: see C Richmond "The Commons becoming 
Uncommon: Integration or Disintegration in the Protection of Aquatic Biodiversity" in P 
M Blascke and K Green (eds) Biodiversity Now (Department of Conservation, Wellington, 
1997) 5. Also seen 69. Note the Fisheries Act 1996 s 301 is also relevant here to the extent 
that is does not allow landowners to farm freshwater fish, unless the Governor-General 
by order in Council consents to it - thereby restricting a landowners right to do use his 
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regime and consent process, and only secondarily influenced by this other 
biodiversity legislation. From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that only in 
rare situations can the RMA provide landowners with redress for 
limitations of their property rights. None of the other biodiversity statutes 
even contemplate any redress for the restriction of the property rights by 
their legislative provisions. This situation means there is no incentive for 
landowners to cooperate with restrictions on their property rights. 
Landowners receive no compensation for any limitations of their property 
rights under the RMA. Only when the restriction is significant enough to 
render the land incapable of reasonable use does the landowner can the 
landowner have any redress. In terms of the conservation of biodiversity, 
this leaves the private landowner as the sole individual who must bear the 
costs of the restriction on their property rights, in order to comply with the 
public's need for biodiversity conservation. The existence of such an 
unfair regime places private landowners in an adversarial position with 
biodiversity protection. This is not a position which is conducive with 
effective biodiversity protection on private land. 
VI JUSTIFICATION OF THE INCURSIONS INTO PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
How then are these restrictions on the private property rights of 
individuals justified, in terms of traditional legal concepts? To answer this 
question, it is necessary to first provide some clarification as to what the 
concept of private property entails under New Zealand law. The following 
section seeks to provide some enlightenment in this area. 
In New Zealand, along with most other Western and common law 
jurisdictions, there is a initial presumption that a private landowner 
property freely. 
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possesses a bundle of rights which enables her to do anything she wishes 
to on that piece of land. Title to land has provided the title-holder with 
virtually all rights in the land: exclusive, undisturbed possession for an 
indeterminate duration, and the right to encumber it, or sell it in 
perpetuity. The full concept of ownership is said to include:m 
a) The right to possession of a thing; 
b) The right to use a thing; 
c) The right to manage a thing; 
d) The right to income derived from others' use of a thing; 
e) The right to the capital value of a thing; 
f) The right to security against expropriation of a thing; 
g) The power to sell, give or bequeath a thing; 
h) The lack of any term on the possession of those rights in respect of a 
thing; 
i) The duty to refrain from using the thing in a way that harms others; 
j) The potential liability that judgments may be executed against the 
thing. 
However, property rights have never been defined absolutely, but rather 
have evolved over the centuries through common law developments and 
modifications by parliamentary statute.
112 Certain basic property rights 
have remained, 113 but many others have been circumscribed in various 
ways. In the common law in particular, the ability of the state to restrict 
landowners rights is particularly evident from the overarching doctrine of 
111 Waldon, above n 109, 49. Waldon notes these are not conditions of ownership, but 
simply assist in identifying the elements which make it up. 
11 2 Common law restrictions on private property rights include private nuisance and 
negligence. Early examples of statutory abrogation of private property rights include: the 
Magna Carta 1297 c 29, which made it clear that freemen can still lose their property if 
that occurs according to the law; the Petition of Right Statute 1627 c 4, which stated that 
no man should lose his land or tenements without due process of law. 
113 For example the right of a private property owner to exclude others from using her 
property, enforceable via the tort of trespass. 
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tenure, in that the fee simple title to land is only ever held of the Crown's 
superior interest in the land. 114 
The basis of the justification for private property right incursions lies in 
New Zealand and common law makers' implicit acceptance of the 
positivist conceptions of property asserted by Bentham. He asserted that 
society defines property by reference to community standards.115 If an 
individual's community generally supports and enforces her reasonable 
expectations about what she can do with the resources in her possession, 
then her rights to do those things are part of her property in that resource. 
If the community views the individual's expectations as being 
unreasonable and unsupportable, then she may not claim the right to do 
those things as part of her property. 116 The concept of property is the 
mechanism the community uses to protect certain reasonable expectations 
in an object. Community standards that distinguish between reasonable 
and unreasonable expectations become property rules. Under such an 
analysis, the legislature believes it appropriate to restrict property rights in 
relation to the natural environment and biodiversity, due to it being the 
elected representation of community standards. This role of community 
expectations is particularly evident in the operation of the RMA in New 
Zealand. The community's expectations are expressed via public 
participation in the formulation of plans and policy statements. The 
resulting plans are said to being representative of the community's 
expectations on the restriction of private property rights. 117 
114 Rural Banking and Finance Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Official Assignee [1991] 2 
NZLR 351, 355 (HC). 
115 J Bentham A Commentary on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government (University 
of London Athlone Press, London, 1977) 109. 
116 Bentham, above n 115, 115-119; see also F I Michelan "Property, Federalism and 
Jurisprudence" (1993) 35 Wm & Mary L Rev 301. 
117 Speech by Minister for the Environment: Right Honorary Simon Upton - "Property 
rights / Resource Management" at 
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On the other side, those against restrictions on property rights for 
biodiversity conservation support a greater emphasis on Lockean natural 
law as the foundation for the concept of property. Rather than viewing 
property as creations of our legal system, Lockean influenced scholars 
assert that property exists naturally, without law, and is understandable 
through the exercise of human reason.
118 Hence the legal system was 
developed to protect pre-existing property rights. Under nature's law, 
Locke explained, each person had the right to mix his labour with the 
land, thereby adding value to it and becoming its lawful owner.
119 
Accordingly, property was an individual right, something that arose out 
of the natural order of the world, independently of any community action, 
Lockean scholars see property rights as reflecting the relative importance 
of individual autonomy and the relative unimportance of community 
interests. 120 
Locke's natural law argument for private property has not faired well 
from late 201h century legal criticism, and perhaps hence New Zealand's 
adherence to the positivist foundation of property promoted by Bentham. 
Schlatter and others have shown that Locke's labour theory only made 
sense in a world where land and raw materials were abundant.
121 In the 
real world of scarcity, the labour theory justified only a more modest 
property claim. At the most the labourer owned the value added by her 
efforts: she owned the crops that she planted and tended, not the farm 
land itself. To justify such rights, one must turn to an entirely different 
philosophic base, that of social utility. 
<http:/ /www.arcadia.co.nz/speeches/171298_2.htm> (last accessed 29September 1999). 
11 8 J Locke Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
303-320. 
119 Locke, above n 118, 305. 
120 R Epstein Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1985) 231-9. See also CM Rose "Enough and as Good of What?" (1987) 
81 NW L Rev 417. 
121 R Schlatter Private Property: The History of an Idea (Russell & Russell, New Brunswick, 
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Locke having been marginalised, private property in New Zealand society 
is chiefly based on utilitarian arguments. It is justified only to the extent 
that its overall consequences are good. What has become clear to modern 
scholars is that, far from transcending the human community, private 
property is very much a product of it. From earliest known times, human 
communities found it useful to develop norms authorising the private 
control of land and other things. These rights were created by the 
community, and were enforced only when and so long as the community 
stood behind them. Property norms at any time reflect the circumstances 
and values of their creators. Today, the simple fact is that there is no 
unfettered right to use property in any way that an owner chooses. New 
Zealand society relies on respecting property rights, but acknowledges 
that this requires accepting limitations on private property rights. Every 
privately owned property in New Zealand carries with it a bundle of 
rights that are constrained by community created rules restricting use in 
some way or another. 
VII IT IS POSSIBLE TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF 
BIODIVERSITY LOSS ON PRIVATE LAND UNDER CURRENT 
CONCEPTIONS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY? 
This section of the paper attempts to establish whether it is at all possible, 
under New Zealand society's current conceptions of private property, to 
achieve the effective protection of biodiversity on private land. The first 
issue addressed considers whether the use of compensation can provide 
assistance in the problem of encouraging landowners to comply with the 
restriction of property rights in the name of preserving biodiversity. 
Having answered the first issue in the negative, the second issue discussed 
1973) 160. 
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intends to examine the nature of private property, and in particular its 
failure to take into account the ecological values associated with human 
existence. It is submitted that our current conceptions of private property 
do not recognise the interests of biotic communities. Hence this non-
recognition, despite the endeavours of remedy by regulation, will forever 
hinder any attempts at successful protection of biodiversity on private 
land. 
A Is Compensation for Property Rights Restrictions the Solution for 
Biodiversity Conservation? 
Many biologists and ecological commentators have suggested that the 
unavailability of a compensation regime for restrictions on property rights 
is an important reason why biodiversity protection on New Zealand land 
has not been effective.122 Admittedly the lack of any compensation for any 
property right restrictions does negate the cooperative nature of 
relationship between the Crown and landowner necessary for effective 
biodiversity protection. However jurisdictions which have adopted a 
compensation for taking regime, such as the United States, have fared no 
better in their success in biodiversity conservation.123 While such a regime 
may address the unfairness a particular individual may have undergone if 
her land was so significantly restricted to be eligible for compensation, 
there is no evidence to show that biodiversity protection as a whole has 
benefited from the implementation of a compensation for taking regime. It 
is possible that this lack of success is due to the threshold for being eligible 
for a takings regime being so high. 124 In the United States, only in 
122 K Ryan "Should the RMA Include a Taking Regime?" (1998) 2 NZJEL 63. 
123 K A Scanna "The National Biological Survey: A Step Along the Path to Ecosystem 
Conservation" (1995) 4 NY U Envtl L J 134, 135-6. 
12
" In the US, the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states "nor shall private property 
be taken for public use without just compensation". The application of this clause to 
situations where the state has restricted use of private property has been muddled. In 
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uncommon situations has the Supreme Court granted such 
• 125 compensation. 
It may be that if compensation was more readily available, for example if 
compensation was payable for any significant restriction on a landowners 
rights, then landowners would be more willing to make the effort for 
biodiversity. 126 However it is submitted that this is a na'ive and overly 
simplistic assessment of the situation. Firstly not all landowners will be 
motivated to assist the protection of biodiversity on their land just because 
they may be compensated for having to forego certain rights associated 
with their land. Some may still resist the restriction of their rights even 
though compensation is available, especially if the landowner values the 
use of the property right greater than the compensation. This possible of 
continued non-compliance is potentially very damaging to plant and 
animal life because, as discussed in Section II, biodiversity loss is 
irreversible. Secondly, it is very difficult to design a system that allows for 
compensation when landowners genuinely wish to use their land for a use 
without effectively inviting everyone to allege they wish to do the same 
thing.127 Under this "floodgates" argument, it is difficult to formulate a 
logical and appropriate threshold differentiating those who should receive 
compensation and those who should not. At what point and under what 
criteria will a landowner be eligible for compensation? It is the actual loss 
Armstrong v United States (1960) 364 US 40 the Supreme Court described the purpose of 
the takings clause as "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole" . But it is still not clear what circumstances constitute a regulatory taking and 
what are compensable and no-compensable regulatory takings. 
125 E Elliot "How Takings Legislation Could Improve Environmental Regulation" (1997) 
38 Wm & Mary L Rev 1177, 1188. 
126 For example in 1995, the United States Congress passed a Bill which provided 
compensation for property owners in the event that a specified government action 
devalued their property by 33% or more. This Bill has not yet been ratified. 
127 In that the public should not be required to compensate landowners for not taking 
action they never intended taking. See speech by Minister for the Environment: Right 
Honorary Simon Upton - "Property rights / Resource Management" at 
<http:/ /www.arcadia.co.nz/speeches/171298_2.htm> (last accessed 29September 1999). 
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of value in the property, or the potential loss of value for the restrictions 
on future uses, and is this to be measured in market value terms or on the 
subjective value to the landowner? Issues such as these can be integral in 
enticing of landowners to cooperate with the biodiversity protection 
regulation under a compensation regime.
128 And lastly, common sense 
suggests that merely throwing money at a landowner will not promote the 
conservation of biodiversity. Compensation alone will not encourage pro-
active steps for conservation by landowners. It is the opinion of the author 
that the creation of a compensation regime for restrictions on the rights of 
a private landowner, while potentially capable of providing some 
assistance and addressing individual unfairness, is not the solution to 
effective biodiversity conservation in New Zealand. 
B The Primary Problems with Private Property Law and 
Biodiversity Protection 
The guiding norms of private property rights in New Zealand incorporate 
very little of society's knowledge of ecological values, and this is 
particularly evident in the case of biodiversity. The short comings lie not 
in the details of property law, but rather in the shortcomings that cut deep 
into the central ideas of what private property entails. The following 
section aims to identify the key reasons why private property law has 
proved so ineffectual in biodiversity protection. 
128 Another often proposed solution to encourage voluntary support for biodiversity 
protection by landowners is the use of financial incentives such as tax breaks. These 
incentives are not discussed in depth in the paper, due to its focus on the legal 
mechanisms to protect biodiversity and not policy type mechanisms. However for the 
sake of completeness, the argument for financial incentives is that, because they establish 
an entitlement, people are encouraged to pursue such opportunities. Admittedly such 
incentive may assist biodiversity conservation, but the author submits that for the very 
same reasons discussed under compensation, such incentives are not the solution for 
biodiversity depletion. Incentives can only ever be motivational mechanisms to 
encourage biodiversity conservation. They are not able to ensure the protection of 
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Firstly, property law assumes that people are distinct from the land - that 
humans are subjects of the law and the land is merely an object. Harm to 
humans is redressed under property, but harm to the land, its habitat or 
non-human inhabitants is not. Harm to biodiversity which has no direct 
effect on an individual cannot be redressed. Humans abuse habitat and 
biodiversity because we regard land as a commodity belonging to us, and 
not as a necessary constituent element of the ecosystems we live in. 
Secondly, property law assumes that people can draw lines on the land 
and thereby divide it meaningfully into discrete pieces. For many 
economic purposes, lines between landowners do make sense. But in 
other, more overlooked, ways these lines are detrimental. Nature does not 
recognise human boundaries. Wildlife and plant life do not define their 
habitat by property lines. Property law has not learned that ecology is 
entirely interconnected. This fact has led to the operation of separate 
management regimes by landowners. Land holding A is managed by one 
owner, land holding B by another. Different landowners employ different 
programmes and priorities for biodiversity, and some employ none. 
Uncoordinated management by landowners makes the promotion of 
biodiversity conservation as a whole very difficult. 129 
Thirdly, property law places too much weight on market value. When 
harm does not cost a landowner money in the market, property law is 
powerless to redress this harm. 13° Common law remedies such as nuisance 
and trespass only take account of damage to the landowner which has a 
biodiversity, which is vital as once biodiversity is gone it cannot be recovered. 
129 Obviously in New Zealand, national, regional and district policy statements and plans 
have attempted to remedy the segmented nature of ecological management. But as 
illustrated in Section IV of the paper, this legislation has yet to prove effective. 
130 Regulation has tried to redress this failure - for example the RMA and Wildlife 
Protection Act 1953. But as shown the various enforcement problems of the legislation 
have hindered its success. 
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value in the market. 131 Biodiversity is particularly affected by this flaw, 
because a significant proportion of biodiversity actually has no value in 
the market. Therefore biodiversity which does not have a value is 
generally outside the scope of property law protection. 
Lastly, property law is flawed in its ecological ignorance. Property is 
incapable of defining the differences in parcels of land. The entitlements of 
private ownership are determined by reference only to a hypothetical 
featureless land parcel, and not by reference to vegetation, wildlife and 
ecosystems. Property law deals with the relative rights among people and 
rights the owner has against the rest of the world. It is only natural for 
subjects of the legal system to overlook biodiversity. The private property 
system for land takes no account of the property inherent in biodiversity. 
The rights of one landowner are the same rights enjoyed by all other land 
owners - independent of the parcel of land's location, resources or 
wildlife. 132 
Many of the failures mentioned are well known to law and policy makers 
in New Zealand. The Crown has attempted to redress the more evident 
ecological failures by the use of regulation and legislation, which aims to 
give the environment and biodiversity some form of priority in the use of 
the rights inherent in property. However, these legislative measures have 
not proved effective. The measures aim to restrict the traditional rights 
inherent in the "property" of that land in favour of the protection of 
biodiversity. Yet the basic premise of property in New Zealand promotes 
and protects individual liberty, something which can be in direct conflict 
131 See discussion in Section II regarding this point. 
132 Admittedly, property law does permit the use of covenants and easements to restrict 
rights relating a specific parcel of land - thus enabling some differentiation between the 
different characters of individual land parcels. However, in New Zealand, the use of 
those mechanisms is relatively uncommon for the protection of ecology, and extremely 
rare for the protection of biodiversity. See G W Hinde and D H McMorland Land Law in 
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with the protection of biodiversity. The mere restraining of the boundaries 
of individual liberty by legislation is not sufficient to alter the inherent 
lack of focus on ecological values in private property rights. It is submitted 
that only when there is an fundamental redefinition of private property 
rights by society, which accounts for the value of ecology in human 
interaction, will biodiversity actually be truly protected on private land. 
C The Microeconomic Critique: Market Failure and Biodiversity 
The notion that property ownership promotes and protects individual 
liberty is strong in the common law's and New Zealand's history. 133 Today 
the major relevance of the principle of individual liberty in property 
relates to its apparent necessity for the successful and efficient operation 
of society as a micro-economic "market". However, it is the author's belief 
that such a justification for the principle of liberty is flawed in the context 
of ecology and biodiversity. The following analysis intends to show why 
this micro-economic justification might be defective. 
Many free market influenced policy makers and economists object to the 
concept of restraints on the individual's freedom to choose, on the basis 
that the use of unrestricted property rights is perceived as able to attain 
both maximum individual and social welfare. 134 They argue that if a 
landowner can use that land and its resources as she wishes, then she may 
achieve the greatest utility to herself. If all landowners use their resources 
or exchange them in the free market for the maximum possible personal 
New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 309. 
133 When feudalism was a recent memory, many subjects of the common law system saw 
ownership of private property as a means to sustenance and political independence, 
without having to depend on an overlord who would demand political allegiance in 
return for providing a place to live and other essentials: see B Yandle "Escaping 
Environmental Feudalism" (1992) 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 517,518. 
134 
For an more in depth analysis of the following microeconomic approach see: Swanson, 
above n 31, 189-199. 
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utility, and this utility is then totalled, by definition the maximum 
aggregate total social utility should be achieved. By allowing landowners 
the freedom to exchange their property for other property, this allows all 
property eventually to reach the person who will value it more than 
anyone else does, thereby putting the property to its most efficient use. 
This microeconomic approach to the bond between property ownership 
and economic freedom emphasises maximum individual control over the 
incidents of property ownership in order to maximise overall social utility. 
Hence microeconomic influenced policy makers argue that the concept of 
private property law can promote both individual and social welfare. In 
terms of the protection of biodiversity, they argue that the provision of 
individual freedom to maximise one's own utility will therefore maximise 
overall social utility, thereby protecting biodiversity. 
However in terms of biodiversity this has not been achieved. If individual 
and social welfare includes the welfare of biodiversity, the market has 
failed. As suggested in the preceding section, it is proffered that this is due 
to the ecological ignorance of our current private property law. In 
acknowledgment of the market's failure to protect biodiversity, legislators 
have created regulation which has restricted private property rights to try 
and rectify the situation. However, as illustrated in Section IV, the 
regulation of property rights to rectify market failure has not been 
effective for biodiversity protection. Biodiversity is so pervasive and all 
encompassing in the lives we, as humans, live that regulation will never 
be sufficient to cover and enforce restrictions on private property. Where 
enforcement by some form of authority is not possible or adequate, then 
history has shown us that restrictions on property rights will often not be 
complied with. Compensation or incentives to comply with the regulation 
may assist the protection of biodiversity but it in itself cannot solve the 
enforcement issue. 
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And yet the New Zealand paradigm for government responses is built 
around remediating failures of the free market to protect biodiversity. 
Policy makers try to fit a problem into one of the standard categories of 
market failure - negative externalities or inadequate information to make 
rational choices - in order to collectively rectify the problem. While air and 
water pollution problems may fit neatly into the externalities category, 
habitat destruction and loss of biodiversity do not fit so well into the 
standard categories of market failure. When policy makers try to deal with 
habitat destruction and the loss of biodiversity as externalities and subject 
them to legislative regulation, many of the parties subject to that 
regulation conclude that such regulation does not make sense. 
Landowners are not accustomed to recognising the protection of 
biodiversity as an important community interest to be harmonised with 
other values of property law. Property laws do not reflect principles of 
biology, ecology and other natural sciences to any where the extent that 
property laws reflect principles of philosophy, sociology and economics. 
In summary, it is submitted that that the microeconomic analysis of 
achieving market equilibrium does not hold true in terms of the 
conservation of biodiversity. The simple fact is that our present 
understanding of the rights entailed in private property does not account 
for the protection of biodiversity. As illustrated, the operation of a market 
is based on clearly defined property rights. If these property rights do not 
take account of the ecological basis for their existence, then how can the 
market ever reach an equilibrium for biodiversity.135 When property rights 
exclude the values of ecology, then the market must also exclude the 
values of ecology in it reaching its equilibrium (or non-equilibrium).136 No 
135 Market equilibrium for biodiversity, in the author's perception, is to be seen as a 
situation where their is no continued loss due to human activity, and where the majority 
of ecosystems and the variety of life inherent in them are able to sustain themselves 
without the need for human management and recovery programmes. 
136 A good example of the failure of the market due to the lack of ecological values in 
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amount of regulation which tries to merely limit private property rights 
will be successful in this respect. Regulation geared to protect biodiversity 
has not altered the fundamentals or true nature of society's current 
perceptions of private property rights. It merely aims modify the edges of 
private property rights, and not the central core. Even where these 
incursions are substantial, the basic values underlying private ownership 
still reign supreme. The principle that a landowner can do what she wants 
with her land is still the dominant premise of our present private property 
law. This means that the value to the individual landowner of utilising her 
rights will almost always be greater than the value of protecting 
biodiversity, and hence biodiversity will suffer. For an effective 
biodiversity protection framework that presumption must be turned on its 
head. Only when biodiversity conservation is required as a given, before 
the need for individual liberty will biodiversity's mediocre situation 
improve. 
D A Better Form of Property? 
Historically, property definitions have continuously adjusted to reflect 
new economic and social structures. Property law has always been 
functional, encouraging behaviour compatible with contemporary goals of 
the community.137 Examples of property law's adaptation to social changes 
are many. As the status of women changed, laws abolished a husband's 
property rights in their wives estates.138 In response to urbanisation, 
legislative zoning has reduced the rights of landowners. A landowner's 
previous right to minerals found on their land are now almost completely 
private property rights is evident in The Tragedy of the Commons - see G Hardin The 
Tragedy of the Commons (1968) Science 1243. 
137 "Social needs are the essential life that give vitality to all legal institutes .... As for the 
property law, to say that social life it creates it is a very great understatement of the 
intimacy of their relation": F S Philbrick "Changing Conceptions of Property In Law 
(1938) 86 U Pa L Rev 691, 694-95. 
abrogated and most immediately vest in the Crown when discovered.139 
In the tradition of the continuing transformation of property rights, an 
alternative ecological view of property has been proposed by jurists such 
as Sax. The land is conceived as part of "the economy of nature" as well as 
the transformative economy. 140 This new perspective acknowledges that 
land is not merely a passive entity waiting to be developed by its 
landowner, but is already delivering ecosystem services to human beings 
and performing public functions m its natural state. In these 
circumstances, compensation ought not to be paid, even where the 
regulated landowner is left with no economically viable use of land. Sax 
recognises some of the problems with this approach and envisages an 
obligation on the part of government to alleviate the pain of the innocent. 
Viewing the world through the lens of nature's economy reduces the 
significance of property lines. A forest would be a habitat for birds and 
wildlife, rather than simply a discrete tract of land containing the 
commodity timber. Under such a view the landowner cannot justify 
development simply by internalising the effect of such a development on 
other properties. Rather the landowner's desire to do anything at all 
creates a problem, because any development affects the delicate ecosystem 
which the untouched land supports. In an economy of nature the 
landowner's role is custodial from the outset, before the owner ever 
138 Matrimonial Property Act 1963, s 5. 
13
' Crown Minerals Act 1991: s 10 states all petroleum, gold, silver, and uranium existing 
in its natural condition in land shall be the property of the Crown; s 11 states every 
alienation of land from the Crown shall be deemed to be made subject to a reservation in 
favour of the Crown of every mineral existing in its natural condition in the land. 140 J Sax "Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas" (1993) 45 
Stan L Rev 1433 ["Understanding Lucas"]. The transformative economy is our current 
type of economy where undeveloped land is perceived as essentially inert until it is put 
to use - a discrete entity that can be made one's own by working it and transforming it 
into a human artefact. This approach gives individuals broad discretion to choose what to 
do with their property. See also R E Ricklefs The Economy of Nature: A Textbook in Basic 
Ecology (W H Freeman, New York, 1997); D Worster Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994). 
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transforms the land. Moreover, the object of the custody generally extends 
beyond the owner's legally defined dominion. The notion that the land is 
solely the owner's property, to develop as the owner pleases, is 
unacceptable. 
Such system of private property rights is not unknown to New Zealand 
society. In fact, many indigenous peoples actually perceive themselves as 
merely a constitutional element of the ecosystem they live in.141 Under 
customary Maori law, no one individual or kinship could ever own the 
land.142 Rather different levels of the hapu social order exercised different 
rights in the same area of land. These rights were ordered and prioritised 
accordingly to well recognised cultural and ecological principles but with 
a marked emphasis on context so that the solution chosen best suited the 
demands on the moment. The concept of kiatiakitanga inherent in the 
exercise of those rights meant tangata whenua could only exercise those 
rights in the land with the stewardship of the resources as the primary 
concern. 143 Hence it is possible that a system of private property rights can 
operate with the inclusion of environmental values. 
Accordingly the next question is what property rights could be designed 
to meet the demands of both perceptions of the land rights and meet the 
demands of biodiversity protection and private property rights? 
Unfortunately, the scope of this paper does not allow for detailed 
consideration of the possibilities. Sax has argued that the most compatible 
existing model is that of usufructuary rights. 1~4 Other commentators such 
141 See generally: C L Wickliffe Indigenous Polities, Self-government, Law, Citizenship and 
Property Rights: A Comparative Study of the United States of America, Canada, and New 
Zealand (Victoria University, Wellington, 1997). 
142 R Boast and others Maori Land Law (Butterworths, Wellington, 1999) 25-30. 
143 Boast and others, above n 142, 
141 "Understanding Lucas" above n 140, 1452. In that the owner of a usufruct does not 
have exclusive dominion of her land; rather, she only has a right to uses compatible with 
the community's pre-established requirements. A current example of such a right is the 
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as Stroup and Goodman have preferred redefinition of the concept of 
ownership so as to incorporate the concept of ecological stewardship. 145 In 
future many more ecologically sound property regimes will be proposed 
as property scholars and jurists grapple with the concept of reconceiving 
property rights from an ecological perspective. Time will be the only judge 
as to which approach society will take, if any, to redress to issue of 
biodiversity conservation. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
This paper has considered the different strands of meaning which form 
the concept biodiversity, illustrating some of the problems entailed in 
using such encompassing concept as a legislative guideline. The many 
different patches which make up the crazy patchwork of legislative 
biodiversity protection mechanisms for private land are also examined. 
Statutes such as the RMA, the Wildlife Act 1953 and the Forests Act 1949 
all serve their part in providing some protection to aspects of biodiversity 
on private land. However, as a whole, the current legislative crazy 
patchwork adopted in New Zealand to protect our biodiversity resources 
on private land has proved ineffective. The author has identified several 
problems in the legislation which may be responsible for this 
ineffectiveness. Those discussed include the poor implementation and 
enforcement of legislative provisions, the lack of a holistic approach to 
protecting biodiversity in the legislation and the lack of compensation for 
the abrogation of property rights. 
However the key reason cited by the author for the ineffectiveness of the 
right to use navigable bodies of water for transport and fishing, but only to that the 
extent - no right to take water or pollute. 
145 R Stroup and S Goodman "Property Rights, Environmental Resources, and the Future" 
(1992) 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 427. 
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legal framework is the inherent conflict between private property rights 
and the public need for biodiversity protection. New Zealand, as a society 
in which private property rights are well recognised and enforced, must 
begin to question the use of property right limiting regulation as a policy 
instrument to address the problem of biodiversity conservation on private 
land. Overall, private landowners have not embraced vast regulatory 
incursions into the historically privileged realm of private property, even 
though these incursions have been justified by the public good of 
biodiversity conservation. 
The paper has argued that the current understanding of private property 
rights in New Zealand, which excludes the ecological principles intrinsic 
in human existence, is inherently inconsistent with the protection of 
biodiversity on private land. It is the author's belief that this inconsistency 
is sufficiently extensive so as to be the major reason why existing 
regulatory attempts to protect biodiversity have proved practically 
ineffective in New Zealand. Even with regulatory restrictions which 
attempt to address the failure of property rights to account for biodiversity 
protection, the fundamental individual libertarian basis of private 
property impairs the ability of the regulation to be effective. If biodiversity 
is to ever thrive on private land, the fundamental nature of private 
property rights must be altered to include to ecological values inherent in 
the very existence of society. Property rights must change to accept, as 
primary basis for their existence, that the principle of individual liberty 
cannot ever ride roughshod over the needs of biodiversity and the 
ecological environment. 
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